The awareness about this moral duty results in the
‘‘good will’’ – the pure incentive upon which the act
is based. Kant’s Categorical Imperative (CI) intro-
duces the idea of universalization as the deontological
epitome, the supreme criterion for ultimate ethical
behavior. The first and foremost formula introduces
the CI in utmost rational abstraction: ‘‘Act only
according to that maxim whereby you can at the
same time will that it should become a universal law’’
(Kant, tr.1993: 30 [421]). However, the end-in-itself
formula of the CI, as being more clearly related to
human dignity and practical life, tells us even more
for our context: Act in such a way that you treat
humanity, whether in your own person or in the
person of another, always the same time as an end and
never simply as a means (Kant, tr. 1993: 36 [429]).
Practically, the message here is: Whatever you do,
take into account the equally valid entitlement of
others to enjoy a life in freedom within the bound-
aries of justice that is relevant for all and everyone. Or
for those who like it more drastically: If you want to
be ethical, then become universalizable without
conceptual or consequential contradiction. This may
be too eminent a call for any human being and might
only be met in approximation, but grasping the
guiding idea might certainly help one to act in an
ethically conscious and responsible way.
After this deontological excursion into moral
philosophy let us look at another example of ethical
misconduct in the workplace. Critical Path Inc, a
company that provides outsourced email and web-
messaging services, was founded in 1997 and had its
IPO in 1999.21 This was during the heyday of in-
ternet stocks, and since most companies were not
turning a profit, analysts and investors focused
on revenues, rather than profits, as the basis for
determining how well a company was performing. In
the quarter ended June 2000, the company reported
revenues of $33.5 million and a net loss of over
$20 million. But, since the corporate executives had
determined to sell the company, keeping the com-
pany a darling of Wall Street became the primary
objective (Elgin, 2001). This meant reinforcing the
view that the company was growing rapidly. When
reporting the quarterly results the president an-
nounced that the firm expected to turn a profit by the
quarter ending December 2000, that same year. The
increased revenues were expected to come primarily
from the revenues of acquired companies.
By late September 2000, it had become evident to
insiders that Critical Path would not meet Wall
Street’s expectations for quarterly revenue or earn-
ings. As the company approached the fourth quarter
2000, according to the SEC, Critical Path’s president
and its sales chief concluded there were no legitimate
means by which Critical Path could achieve the
ambitious revenue and earnings goals the company
had announced.22 With the company’s reputation
and ‘‘sale value’’ at stake, the president along with
several other key individuals, including some vice-
presidents, concocted a few bogus sales and other
transactions, all of which made it appear that the
company had reached sales targets. As Business Week
(Aug 6, 2001) reported, the company’s focus was on
increasing the stock price and not strengthening the
business.
At the same time, behind the scenes, the president
and others were quietly selling their shares of Critical
Path. One executive thought that ‘‘Critical Path was
playing with fire and [he] decided to sell 1,300 shares
of his company stock before he got burned’’ (Liedtke,
2002).23 According to a class action lawsuit against the
company filed in early February 2001, top insiders
sold their Critical Path stock for as much as $78 per
22 Edwin R. Micewski and Carmelita Troy
share. Once the irregularities were announced, the
stock price fell to below $4 per share.24 Critical Path
employees in the know avoided losses of over
$900,000 because of illegal insider trading.25
Those unfortunate enough to not have insider
information saw the value of their Critical Path shares
drop from a high of over $300 per share in September
2000 to a low of $3 per share in April 2001. One
investor, who lost her nest egg in the Critical Path
debacle, brought it down to the point: ‘‘I just
don’t think they realized that they were playing
with other people’s money.’’26 Not only were they
playing with the fortunes of their shareholders, they
were also playing with the livelihoods of their
employees. In order to survive under the cloud of
allegations of accounting fraud and an SEC investi-
gation, the company laid off 450 of its employees,
which accounted for about half of the company
personnel.27
