Response to peer #1 (AR)
One of the lessons learned in the Chi Mak chapter is that the FBI and NCIS cooperated well for this case. According to Olson, they, “were the furthest thing from parochial. Their cooperation, sharing of information, and mutual respect were exemplary,” (Olson, 2019). While it is not discussed much further than that in the book, I still believe it to be a very important lesson for not just this and other Chinese espionage cases, but for all other cases, and even life. In the past, it has been discussed in Olson’s book how none of the other US intelligence agencies get along with one another. This distain for one another has led to multiple agencies working on the same cases and withholding information from one another, when if they had just combined their information together, they could have solved the case much faster and more efficiently.
In the Mak case, the FBI and NCIS put this aside and worked together. This shows that agencies do have the ability to put their heads together to get a job done. If all the agencies operated like this all of the time, then gaining information on a Chinese espionage case, or any other type of case, would happen much more efficiently. Potential traitors could be caught quicker, more incriminating evidence could be put together for a better case, more employees working on a case could allow for more ideas and more time put into working. The positive outcome possibilities are endless when multiple agencies just work together like how they did here.
Response to peer 2 (NR)
The key lesson from the Chi Mak chapter is the need to apply the same level of scrutiny to contracted workers in the same way you would to those who work for the government if they have the potential to deal with important information. While CIA, FBI, and DoD workers are trained in keeping classified information private other may not be as well versed in what needs to be kept secret. In particular scientist who typically foster a culture of sharing knowledge with each other freely. The process of the Chinese government sending engineers and scientist to gather information on technological advancements poses a serious intelligence risk when the contracted companies deal with important information and don’t vet the hires properly. It would likely make sense for any company that does work with the United States government to have to go through mandated classified information training to defend classified information.
The inclusion of nongovernmental spies is something that seems to be forgotten about at times. The stereotypical spy is working in government agencies while many of the security risks in particular with cases having to do with spies from the Chinese government seem to come from companies that work with the United States government. The Chi Mak case was a huge counterintelligence challenge as the spy did not bring much attention to themselves unlike the Chin case where Chin lived a lavish life based on his salary from the Chinses government. It also seems relevant from the Chi Mak case that Power Paragon took the side of the spy likely in an attempt to save face from the embarrassment of letting a spy into the company. This case does have the long-term implication of being a foundation for stronger background checks as well as being a plan for finding other spies who keep a low profile.